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1 Cognitive  linguistics  assumes  that  language  forms  an  integral  part  of  the  general
cognitive faculties of the human being and that its functioning is governed by the same
principles that govern the rest of our cognitive operations (Fillmore 1976, 1982, 1985;
Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor 1988; Kay 1997; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987; Talmy 1988,
2000; Taylor 2002; Wierzbicka 1988). Languages are also taken to be emergent, that is, they
arise in the minds of the speakers as the result of their frequent use, not necessitating
any innate, language-specific faculty (Hopper 1987, 1988, 1998; Bybee 2000, 2001; Kemmer
and Barlow 2000;  Langacker 1987,  2000;  Lindblom,  MacNeilage and Studdert-Kennedy
1984; Lindblom 1990; Taylor 2002). 
2 Another  basic  assumption  in  cognitive  linguistics  is  that  the  way  we  humans
conceptualize the world largely depends on our own experiences with it,  that is,  our
conceptual  categories  are  embodied.  This  means  that  they  are  not  just  based  on  the
characteristics of the phenomena themselves, but we categorize the world on the basis of
the way we interact with it (Johnson 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). The
principle of embodiment applies to both physical and psychological experiences and thus
includes language as well (Lakoff 1987: xvi). And finally, in their essence, languages are
seen as symbolic systems in that all the units of language converge in the realization of this
one goal of expressing meaning (Croft 2001; Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor 1988; Goldberg
1995,  2006;  Kay  1997;  Lakoff  1987;  Langacker  1987;  Taylor  2002;  Talmy  1988,  2000;
Wierzbicka  1988).  Not  just  the  lexicon  but  also  grammar  expresse  meaning  by
semantically structuring the lexical content, and the meanings of the two in fact match
and reinforce one another (Goldberg 1995, 2006). 
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3 To form and understand complex expressions, the smallest meaningful units, morphemes
and  word-formation  schemas,  are  conceptually  integrated  or  ‘blended’  with  other
meaningful  constructions,  metaphorical  domains,  general  conceptual  schemas,  etc.
Blending is thus a matter of conceptually integrating the inputs from several distinct
mental  spaces  into  one,  the  blended  space  (Fauconnier,  2004,  2009;  Fauconnier  and
Turner, 1994, 1996). A blend is a new structure, it is not simply a unification of the input
spaces, but “ [T]he ‘whole’ that we find in the blend is…both greater and smaller than the
sum  of  the  ‘parts’,  ”thus allowing  new  concepts  and  understandings  to  emerge
(Fauconnier and Turner, 1994: 16). 
4 Research in the framework of the Neural Theory of Meaning suggests that understanding
language  involves  mental  simulation  of  the  meaning  (Feldman,  2006),  which  means,
among other things, that language in general and blending in particular is not simply a
question of manipulating abstract, disembodied symbols. Let us take the action verb walk
to illustrate what the Neural Theory means by the mental simulation of meaning. When
we walk, the parts of the brain that control this motor movement must obviously be
activated.  When we watch someone else walk,  the same parts of  the brain are again
activated. And what is more, when we hear the word walk, the same parts of the brain are
yet  again  activated.  This  shows  that,  indeed,  at  least  certain  aspects  of  language
understanding involve actual mental simulation the meaning. It, of course, also shows
that language is embodied. 
 
1.2. Cognitive phonology
5 If we accept the claim by cognitive linguistics that languages are fundamentally symbolic
systems,  this  view  must  also  be  reflected  in  our  conception  of  phonology.  Now,  if
languages are symbolic systems, then it follows that what speakers learn in the course of
language acquisition are symbolic systems, and I have proposed that in such systems, the
phonemes have no status independent of the meaningful units (Välimaa-Blum, in press,
2009, 2005). It is not unequivocally established that linguistically untrained speakers even
have  spontaneously  emerging  awareness  of  meaningless  entities  like  the  phonemes
(Liberman et  al., 1980;  Read et  al., 1986;  Lotto and Holt,  2000;  Port  and Leary,  2005).
Breaking up words into sequences of discrete phonemes, is basically no more than an
academic  exercise,  largely  inspired  by  alphabetic  writing  (Tomasello,  2003;  Port  and
Leary, 2005). Knowing how to write is part of modern life, and as such it belongs to the
knowledge base that speakers must have of their language(s), but it can be argued that
this knowledge is largely metalinguistic in that it has been learned in educational settings
(Välimaa-Blum, in press,  2009).  This  claim is  inherent in the following citation:  “[I]n
normal language use, the focus of attention is the meaning of an utterance. Subordinate
levels become the focus of attention only under special circumstances,” such as linguistic
experimentation (McNeill and Lindig 1973: 430). This statement highlights the important
fact that speakers express meaning and listeners try to seek out that meaning. Speech
sounds are obviously indispensable in spoken language, but they are entirely subservient
to meaning.
6 Exemplar theory proposes that human beings categorize and memorize their experiences
in terms of so-called exemplar clouds, which are large clusters of remembered episodes of
individual  experiences  (Goldinger  1998;  Johnson  1997;  2005a,  2005b;  Nosofsky  1998;
Pierrehumbert  1994,  2001b,  2002;  Pierrehumbert,  Beckman  and  Ladd  2000;  Goldberg
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2006). In phonology, this means that speakers do not form abstractions of words in terms
of their formal features, but remember the individual occurrences of the words as they
were perceived. These episodic tokens give rise to a mental lexicon containing highly
detailed  information  of  both  the  predictable  and  non-predictable  properties  of  the
sounds, and even data relating to individual speakers, speaking styles and dialects are
conserved. The conception of the mental lexicon in terms of exemplar memories actually
eradicates  the  traditional  difference  between  the  phonemic  and  phonetic  levels,  for
exemplar memories of words are no different from the actually observed episodes of
them.
7 The  traditional  generative  phonology  takes  the  phoneme  to  be  an  underspecified,
abstract  entity  (Archangeli,  1988a,  1988b),  and  in  certain  cognitive  approaches,  the
phoneme  is  schematic,  that  is,  also  underspecified  (Langacker,  1987;  Taylor  2002;
Mompeán-González,  2004).  Nathan, largely  in  the  framework  of  Natural  Phonology
(Donegan & Stampe, 1969; Stampe, 1969, 1979, 1987), suggests that the phoneme is an
‘over-specified’ mental percept “fully specified for all possible features” (Nathan, 2007:
94). These views go against experimental evidence indicating that even the predictable
phonetic detail is in the mental dictionary, in other words, the mental lexicon is not
underspecified (Miller  1994;  Fougeron and Steriade 1997;  Bybee 2000;  Pierrehumbert,
Beckman and Ladd 2000; Ohala and Ohala 1995). 
8 If  the  phoneme  were  a  schematic  or  otherwise  underspecified  entity,  this  would
necessitate some kind of derivation or modification of the mental representation of the
lexical  entries  to achieve the actual,  fully-specified articulations in speech.  However,
exemplar memories with a fully-specified lexicon remove the need for any modification
as there is no difference between the phonological and phonetic forms. With exemplar-
type memories of words, phonology is as continuous as phonetics. Also, Coleman argues
that lexical  entries are stored in terms of  an auditory,  not articulatory sound shape,
which  also  entails  that  there  is  no  derivation,  but,  as  we  speak,  the  articulatory
commands are created ‘on-the-fly‘ (Coleman, 1998). 
9 The schematic representation is sometimes proposed to be the prototypical member of
the phoneme (Langacker,  1987;  Taylor,  2002;  Mompeán-González,  2004),  which would
mean that the prototypes of phonemes are never instantiated as such. I  have argued
myself that the hyperspeech forms establish the prototypes of words, and that there are
no prototypes of individual phonemes, but only of symbolic units. Even if we accepted
that each individual phoneme had a prototype, it would be impossible to settle the issue
as to which occurrences would be the best exemplars (Välimaa-Blum, 2009). By definition,
an isolated phoneme contains no co-articulatory information while any contextual one
does, so the decision would have to be between isolated and contextual sounds. However,
in natural language use, sounds do not normally occur alone, so the prototype would have
to  be  a  contextual  token.  But  since  different  phonemes  affect  the  adjacent  sounds
differently (Potter, Kopp and Kopp, 1966), a contextual sound could not be the prototype
either. But if we accept that there are no prototypes of individual phonemes, and that the
best  exemplars  of  words are their  hyperticulated variants  (Lindblom,  1990),  then we
escape spurious solutions in the search of prototypes for phonemes. I will next discuss the
status  of  phonotactics  in  cognitive  phonology,  and  the  discussion  above  forms  the
backdrop for the following sections. 
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1.3. Phonotactics
10 In no language can the phonemes occur in just any order, but the permissible sequences
obey precise principles. The positive phonotactic constraints identify the sequences that
are permitted in the language and the negative ones those, which are not. The allowable
combinations cover not only that which actually occurs, but also those sequences that
might  occur.  Consequently,  for  example,  the  following  two  nonce  words,  i.e.,  words
invented for specific purposes, blague and *bnague have a different status. The former
conforms to the positive constraints whereas the latter violates them. Hence, no new
word coming into English today would begin with the sequence /bn/ whereas blague may
well be a future word. There is thus a negative constraint in English excluding word
initial /bn/, in the form, say, *#[stop][nasal]. The question arises now as to the status of
phonotactic constraints in cognitive phonology in general and that of the negative ones
in particular.
11 As noted above, cognitive linguistics and usage-based grammars do not postulate any
innate, language-specific aptitude to humans, but a speaker’s knowledge of his language
emerges on the basis of the general human perceptual-cognitive-bodily capacities and the
actual language use (Hopper 1987, 1988, 1998; Bybee 2000, 2001; Bybee and Hopper 2001;
Kemmer and Barlow 2000; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987, 2000; Talmy, 1988, 2000; Taylor
2002). Thus, all knowledge of a language derives from the positive instances of it that
have been observed and/or produced. If this is indeed so, then all abstract principles for
that  which  cannot  be  said  are  excluded.  Furthermore,  given  that  languages  are
fundamentally  symbolic  systems,  there  is  no  motivation  for  speakers  even  to  form
independent memory structures of  the speech sounds per se,  but they have episodic
memories of the meaningful units only (Välimaa-Blum 2005, 2009, in press). Phonemes
thus exist in the long-term memory exclusively as components of the symbolic entities,
and all knowledge of individual phonemes is metalinguistic. In principle then, it follows
from  the  absence  of  memory  structures  of  phonemes that  abstract  phonotactic
constraints are excluded as well, be they positive or negative. 
12 If the speech sounds have no independent status in the minds of speakers, what is the
nature  in  a  speaker’s  grammar  of  the  positive  constraints,  which  govern  the
distributional  patterns  of  these  meaningless  entities?  And  particularly,  what  is  the
position of the negative constraints, which exclusively pertain to something that cannot
occur in the language? Consider Taylor’s assessment of this situation:
Within  a  usage-based  model  ...  there  is  no  place  for  negative  phonotactic
statements.  To claim that a particular form is ‘ungrammatical’  is  tantamount to
saying that  the  form has  never  been encountered and that  there  is  no schema
which  can  sanction  it.  The  grammar  of  a  language  comprises  only  ‘positive
statements’ about what does occur, there is no need for ‘negative statements’ of
what does not occur (Taylor 2002: 250-251). 
13 However, children’s productions like holded and breaked demonstrate that speakers can
very well say what they have neither heard nor said before. This is so because the human
mind is creative and imaginative and thus able to conceive abstract patterns of what is
grammatically well formed, in this case, the schema for the regular past tense. Of course,
there is no strict guarantee that a given child has never heard the tokens holded or breaked
, but I do maintain that children do create words like these on their own, even without
ever encountering them. There are countless examples analogous to these in the corpus
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of  any  child’s  acquisition  data.  In  theory,  holded  and  breaked  ‘should’  be  perfectly
grammatical in English, but in practice, they form exceptions to the general principle.
However, knowing that holded and breaked are ill  formed, ungrammatical,  depends on
knowing held and broke. In other words, positively knowing what something is (i.e., held,
broke) entails also knowing what counts as not being that something (holded, breaked). I
claim that the same holds for negative phonotactics. If one knows what is phonotactically
well-formed one is also able to recognize that which is not.
14 I will argue that the positive constraints correspond to (i) procedural knowledge of the
actually occurring, well-formed sound sequences, and (ii) Gestalt-like knowledge of what
constitutes a well-formed word in the language. Neither of these requires autonomous
memory structures of the individual speech sounds. Gestalt-like knowledge is something
that is schematic,  not detailed, and the whole is more than the sum of its parts.  For
example, Figure 1 can easily be seen as the human face even in the absence of most detail.




15 However, if speakers have no independent exemplar or other memories of phonemes,
how is it that they can distinguish phonotactically well-formed nonce words from those
that are ill-formed (Schatzman and Kager 2007)? I propose that this ability arises from the
interplay of the two kinds of knowledge of the positive constraints and an auditorily
represented mental lexicon (Coleman 1998), based on exemplars. It emerges from this
that  knowing  the  actually  occurring  sound  sequences,  i.e.,  the  positive  phonotactic
patterns, entails knowing the negative ones as well, but without any explicit constraints. 
 
2. Coarse-grained and gradient versus pure abstract
constraints
16 There are essentially two different views of the phonotactic constraints, one grounded on
exemplars  and  usage,  the  other  proposing  abstract  categorical  rules.  Pierrehumbert
(2001a), more in the first camp, notes that while phonological theory makes it possible to
state even very fine-grained phonotactic constraints with elaborate segmental-featural
and structural patterns, linguistic and psycholinguistic evidence support the idea that
these constraints are actually much simpler and coarse-grained. As to the reason for this,
Pierrehumbert suggests that phonotactic constraints cannot be highly detailed largely
because of the great variability observed across individual speakers’ vocabularies, that is,
not all speakers know the same words (Pierrehumbert 2001a: 691–692). 
17 Speaking of English in particular, Bybee proposes that acceptable phonotactic patterns
are gradient, “built up on the basis of naturally occurring words of English, not on the
basis of  abstract  categorical  rules extracted from these words” (Bybee 2001:  91).  The
actual contents of the mental lexicon are hence reflected in the knowledge of what is
phonotactically well formed. She emphasizes that the “judgments of acceptability of well-
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formedness are based on the experience of the language user. More familiar strings are
viewed  as  more  acceptable”  (Bybee,  2001:  93).  Bybee  thus  explicitly  argues  against
abstract categorical rules in phonotactics.
18 If  speakers  were  in  possession  of  abstract  categorical  phonotactic  constraints,  these
would presumably apply uniformly across the entire lexicon and to nonce words as well,
but  this  does  not  seem to  be  the  case.  Evidence  rather  indicates  that  judgments  of
acceptable  patterns  are  influenced  by  factors  such  as  word  frequency,  existing
morphological  material  combined with nonce words,  and formal similarity in general
with  existing  words  (Coleman and  Pierrehumbert,  1997;  Pierrehumbert  1994).  Taken
together, these data effectively point to the direction that judgments of phonotactic well-
formedness  are  gradient  and that  knowledge  of  well-formedness  is  coarse-grained.  I
interpret these suggestions to mean that phonotactic constraints are schematic possible-
word templates, for both coarse-grained and gradient suggest lack of a definite, rigid
shape in the constraints.
19 In  contrast  to  these  views,  Shatzman  and  Kager  (2007)  claim  that  speakers  are  in
possession of abstract constraints.  In a recent experiment,  they made Dutch listeners
hear non-word stimuli that either violated or did not violate Dutch phonotactics, and the
listeners had to report whether what they heard was a Dutch word or not. Independently
of lexical factors,  the listeners were faster at rejecting those non-words that violated
phonotactics  than  the  ones  conforming  to  them.  The  authors  suggest  that,  to  their
knowledge,  this  is  “the  first  demonstration  of  the  involvement  of  pure  abstract
phonotactic constraints in on-line speech perception” (Shatzman and Kager, 2007: 1409).
Presumably  both positive  and negative  constraints  were  concerned.  This  would thus
indicate  that  speakers  do possess  independent  knowledge of  the meaningless  speech
sounds and their tactic patterns.
20 However,  these findings  do  not  yet  mean that  speakers  must  have  ‘pure  abstract
phonotactic constraints.’ I will now argue that the ability to separate well-formed and ill-
formed sequences from one another follows from the nature of the positive constraints
and  an  exemplar-based  lexicon.  I  will  make  a  case  for  the  positive  constraints
corresponding to two different kinds of knowledge: procedural knowledge of the actually
occurring,  well-formed  sound  sequences  and  schematic,  Gestalt  knowledge  of  what
constitutes  a  possible  word,  i.e.,  one  that  meets  the  well-formedness  constraints  for
words in the language. The ability to separate well-formed nonce words from ill-formed
ones follows from this  knowledge and the auditorily stored,  exemplar-based lexicon,
without abstract categorical phonotactic constraints. 
 
3. What do speakers know of their language?
3.1. Different kinds of knowledge
21 In learning a language, speakers come to possess several different kinds of knowledge of
it, among them procedural, highly detailed, schematic, episodic and in certain domains
declarative knowledge. The first of them involves a very high degree of automaticity in
speech production. When a language is used frequently, it becomes solidly entrenched in
the  mind  and  the  motor  routines  involved  in  speech  production  become  so  highly
practiced that, e.g., saying words in a foreign language becomes actually awkward. This
automaticity is called procedural knowledge (Anderson 1983, 1993; Boyland 1996; Bybee
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1998,  2001),  and  it  pertains  to  all  domains  of  human  motor  performance,  not  just
speaking. The native articulation of the sound sequences of a language means that the
speaker knows the positive phonotactic constraints of that language at the procedural
level. This knowledge, as procedural knowledge in general, is subconscious, not easily
accessible  to  declarative  statements,  i.e.,  it  is  difficult  for  linguistically  non-trained
speakers to explain how they produce the sound sequences of their language. 
22 We saw above that exemplar theory proposes that speakers conserve in their long-term
memory exemplar clouds of memorized tokens of actually observed words. This signifies
that the mental lexicon is fully specified. Coleman’s (1998) view that the phonological side
of the mental  lexicon is  auditorily,  not articulatorily based is  in full  agreement with
exemplar theory. Speakers have very fine-tuned perceptual capacities which makes it
possible for them to detect and conserve in memory the smallest phonetic and even non-
linguistic detail in the auditory language input. It is this subconscious observation memory
(Johnson, 2005a: 297) that makes it possible for speakers to store highly detailed episodic
memories of speech. 
23 However, possessing highly detailed memories of the sound shapes of words does not
exclude  also  possessing  schematic  knowledge  about  them.  Just  as  speakers  acquire
schematic knowledge of grammatical constructions that transcends the lexical content,
as the examples holded and breaked demonstrate,  they also form Gestalt-knowledge of
phonotactically  well-formed  word  templates  that  transcends  the  actual  segmental
content.
24 The knowledge of what a well-formed word is must be Gestalt-like, not detailed, for it to
cover the whole range of dialectal, stylistic and speaker dependent variability. And, as
Pierrehumbert  (2001a)  notes,  since  the  vocabularies  of  different  speakers  are  not
identical, phonotactic constraints must be such that they encompass this variability as
well, although it seems that the non-overlapping vocabulary items of different speakers
would have to tally with the phonotactics of the shared vocabularies. In any case, it is the
schematic knowledge of what constitutes a possible word in the language that enables a
listener to rise above the individual tokens and accept the phonotactically well-formed
and reject the ill-formed nonce words. The proposal now is that the positive phonotactic
constraints  consist  of  both detailed and elastic  procedural  knowledge of  the allowed
sound sequences and schematic knowledge of possible-word Gestalts. 
 
3.2. Phonotactics and the pronunciation of loans
25 The significance of positive phonotactics becomes strikingly apparent in the case of loan
words.  These  represent  words  not  encountered  before  and  they  are  automatically
adapted to the phonotactics and sound inventory of the adopting language. Let us take an
example from Finnish. Native Finnish phonotactics (i) exclude all word-initial and word-
final  consonant  clusters,  and (ii)  any word-final  consonant  must  be dental;  (iii)  also,
segmental duration is contrastive, and (iv) except for /d/, there are no voiced stops; (v)
Finnish has vowel harmony so that, within a word, apart from the ‘promiscuous’ neutral
vowels /i/ and /e/, only vowels from the same harmonic set can co-occur; finally, (vi) lse
Lehiste (p.c.) suggests that the basic rhythmic unit in Finnish is the disyllabic trochaic
foot. Equipped with this knowledge, we understand the alterations in (1) of two words
borrowed from English.
26  (1) a. (British) English blurb /blɜb/ => Finnish /'løøppi/
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27  (1) b. English web /wɛb/ => Finnish /'veppi/
28 Both of these adaptations are based on schematic knowledge of well-formed words in
Finnish  and  procedural  knowledge  of  speech  production.  The  procedural  knowledge
produces the closest Finnish matches to the non-native sounds. Thus /ɜ/ becomes /øø/,
which is long due to the relatively long duration of tense vowels in English. The vowel /ɛ/
becomes the ‘nearby’ Finnish /e/, and /w/ becomes /v/. Both schematic and procedural
knowledge of well-formed words give rise to the second syllable with a neutral vowel by
thus forming a disyllabic foot.  The stress pattern as well  follows the schematicity of
possible words by assigning primary stress on the initial syllable, hence matching the new
words with the prosodic pattern of the rest of the vocabulary and their basic trochaic
rhythm. The schematic knowledge of a phonotactically well-formed word simplifies the
consonant cluster of blurb by retaining the more sonorous /l/. A monolingual Finnish
speaker  may  not  consciously  realize  that  /blɜb/  versus  /'løøppi/  and  /wɛb/  versus
/'veppi/ are not the same, whereas an English speaker would not even understand that
they ‘are.’
29 Both the procedural phonotactic knowledge and the possible-word Gestalts of the native
language give rise to substitutions and other ‘distortions’ in loans, which can thus move
the borrowed words even far away from their original phonological model. However, now
the loans neatly fit the native lexicon in terms of both segmental and prosodic patterns,
and this is all due to the speakers’ mastery of the procedural and schematic knowledge of
the  phonotactics  of  their  native  language.  We  may  note  at  this  point  that,  strictly
speaking,  when  Taylor  talks  about  speakers  not  knowing  negative  phonotactic
constraints in usage-based grammars because they only know that which has been said
before (Taylor, 2002: 250–251), the question is not so much of absence of a constraint as it
is of absence of positive procedural knowledge.
 
4. Schematic and exemplar memories versus ‘pure,
abstract constraints’
30 Assuming that speakers’ knowledge of phonotactics is at the same time both detailed and
schematic,  the  former  in  the  form of  procedural  knowledge  and the  latter  in  being
Gestalt-like, what can we say about the claim of Shatzman and Kager (2007) that speech
perception involves the use of “pure abstract phonotactic constraints?” Their experiment
used nonce  words,  that  is,  also  words  that  had neither  been heard nor  said  before.
Experimental evidence in general indicates that speech perception makes simultaneous
use of both bottom-up and top-down knowledge sources and that the latter may well be
mediated by exemplar-type, episodic memories (Goldinger and Azuma, 2003: 317). If the
mental lexicon is based on auditory episodes, as Coleman (1998) suggests, and if speech
perception indeed simultaneously uses both top-down and bottom-up knowledge sources,
this explains Shatzman and Kager’s findings in the cognitive framework. 
31 Speech perception is surely as fast as speech production, up to 300 words per minute
(Levelt,  1989),  so that when a listener has to make out whether what he heard is an
existing word or not, he is able to make an extremely rapid search in his mental lexicon
for matches. In this process, a phonotactically well-formed sequence immediately finds a
match with a possible-word template whereas an ill-formed one does not. When no match
is found, the ill-formed sequence can be rejected outright, without further processing. If,
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however, a match is found with a possible-word schema, the listener must also come up
with a meaning before he can confirm whether what he heard is a real word or not, for
pronounceability alone does not confer meaning to a sound sequence. He thus has to
search his memory not only for a match with well-formedness Gestalts but also for a
meaning in the lexicon. 
32 The exemplar memories, which have an auditory character, can be quickly scanned for
meaning because the sound shapes of words are intimately linked with their meaning and
grammar  in  the  long-term  memory,  as  it  is  assumed  in  cognitive  linguistics  and
Construction Grammar (Croft 2001; Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor 1988; Goldberg 1995, 2006;
Kay 1997; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987). It is only when no meaning can be ascertained
that the listener can definitively say that the word is not an existing word, and this lexical
search takes more time than the immediate rejection of a sequence that finds no match
with  a  schematic  possible-word  template.  Thus,  when  listeners  are  able  to  reject
phonotactically ill-formed nonce words faster than the well-formed ones, they make use
of both word Gestalts and the mental lexicon. 
 
5. Discussion
33 Even if knowledge of a language stems from its actual use, as it is assumed in cognitive
linguistics, this does not mean, of course, that speakers refrain from making abstract
generalizations.  Speakers  learn  to  master  the  procedural  commands  needed  in  the
production of  phonologically  and grammatically  well-formed language,  but  they also
extract Gestalt knowledge of it in the form of schemas of both meaningful grammatical
constructions and meaningless possible-word templates. In the mental lexicon speakers
conserve phonetically fully specified exemplar clouds of words,  which simultaneously
conform to and define the phonotactically well-formed patterns. The positive procedural
and schematic knowledge plus the detailed exemplar-based lexicon entail also knowing
that which is not well formed. These different kinds of knowledge do not force speakers
into a narrow groove of what is, but they also allow them to identify what is not. In other
words, knowledge of positive phonotactics entails also knowing that which is ill formed
without,  however,  possessing  any  abstract  phonotactic  constraints  or  distributional
patterns of individual sounds per se.
34 The Motor Theory suggested that we perceive speech in terms of the motor movements
that  are  used  to  produce  it  (Liberman et  al.  1967).  The  Neural  Theory  of  Language
(Feldman 2006) proposes that understanding language is a matter of mental simulation of
meaning. We may understand experiments like that by Shatzman and Kager (2007) in
light  of  these  theories.  The  schematic  knowledge  of  a  possible  word  functions  as  a
cognitive  template  to  pronounceability  à  la  Motor  Theory.  If  the  stimulus  is  not
pronounceable, it cannot be a possible word in the language, and it can be discarded
outright. But if it is pronounceable, that is, if it conforms to a possible-word template, it
might be meaningful as well, and for this the listener must find a further match with
meaning in his long-term memory. 
35 Since the listeners in this experiment had to identify whether or not what they heard was
an  existing,  meaningful  entity,  the  task  was  different  from that  in  ordinary  speech
perception, where words occur in a context and we assume at the outset that they have
meaning. In the experiment, there was thus an additional step, i.e., two decisions about
meaningfulness. I argue that in this kind of situation, (i) the listeners first decide whether
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the stimulus is pronounceable, and only if it is, (ii) do they attempt the mental simulation
of the meaning. The first step concerning pronounceability is almost instantaneous, but
the subsequent decisions, first (i) about meaningfulness in general and then (ii) finding
the actual meaning, require more time. Of course, in the experiment there was no actual
meaning  found,  for  only  nonce  words  were  used.  But  in  any  case,  all  this  can  be
performed without pure abstract phonotactic constraints.
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NOTES
1.  This paper is based on posters presented at the conference on Language, Communication and
Cognition at  University  of  Brighton  in  August  2008  and  at  The  Sixth  Old  World  Conference  in
Phonology at Edinburgh University in January 2009. I  am grateful to the participants for their
helpful comments, but all responsibility for the content of this paper is, of course, mine alone.
RÉSUMÉS
Les contraintes phonotactiques positives correspondent aux séquences de phonèmes autorisées
dans une langue et les contraintes négatives, à celles qui leur sont interdites. Cet article tente de
préciser  le  statut  de  ces  contraintes  dans  la  phonologie  cognitive.  La  linguistique  cognitive
présuppose que les langues sont des systèmes symboliques. Dans ce cadre, il n’est pas évident que
les  locuteurs  disposentdes  structures  mnésiques  des  unités  non-sémantiques  telles  que  les
phonèmes ou la phonotactique (Liberman et al. 1980; Read et al. 1986; Lotto et Holt, 2000; Port et
Leary 2005; Välimaa-Blum 2009, sous presse). Aussi, les cognitivistes se fondent sur l’idée que les
langues émergent en fonction de leur utilisation. En conséquence, les contraintes pour ce qui ne
se dit pas n’ont pas de place dans la linguistique cognitive (Taylor 2002). Néanmoins, Schatzman
et Kager (2007) ont démontré que dans des conditions expérimentales, les sujets sont capables,
parmi une serie de mots inventés,  de rejeter plus rapidement ceux qui vont à l’encontre des
contraintes phonotactiques que ceux qui sont en conformité avec eux. Je vais proposer ici que
cette capacité est le résultat de l’interaction (i) des connaissances procédurales et schématiques
des séquences permises et (ii)  d’un lexique auditif (Coleman 1998). Si un locuteur connait les
contraintes positives, il connait aussi les contraintes négatives, toutes les deux sans contraintes
abstraites.
Phonotactics  is  a  central  concern  in  phonology.  However,  the  status  of  these  constraints  in
cognitive linguistics is different from that in the traditional generative approaches. In cognitive
linguistics, meaningfulness is the essential characteristic of language and it may be that speakers
do not even spontaneously form autonomous memory structures of meaningless units like the
speech sounds, but only of the symbolic ones (Liberman et al. 1980; Read et al. 1986; Lotto and
Holt, 2000; Port and Leary 2005; Välimaa-Blum 2005, 2009, in press). Consequently, phonotactic
constraints,  which pertain to meaningless units,  would constitute no independent knowledge
base either. Also, languages are learned in function of their actual use, and negative phonotactic
constraints, characterizing something that cannot be said, must be excluded on these grounds as
well from a speaker’s grammar since it would be difficult to learn them in the absence of positive
data  (Taylor  2002).  However,  it  has  been  shown  that  listeners  are  able  to  distinguish
phonotactically well-formed nonce words from those that are ill formed (Schatzman and Kager
2007).  I  will  now  argue  that  this  does  not  yet  mean  that  speakers  must  have  independent
knowledge  of  the  phonemes  or  phonotactic  principles.  The  ability  to  separate  what  is
phonotactically well formed from the ill formed is the result of the interplay of (i) two kinds of
knowledge  of  the  positive  constraints,  i.e.,  procedural  and  schematic,  and  (ii)  an  auditorily
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represented mental lexicon (Coleman 1998). Knowing the positive constraints entails knowing
the negative ones as well, but without any pure abstract phonotactic constraints.
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